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This paper reviews UK industrial policy in the context of Brexit and weak productivity performance.  It 
considers proposals made in a recent White Paper as well as more general arguments for reform now 
that the ‘post-Thatcher consensus’ has ended.   The desirability of improving horizontal policies in the 
areas of innovation, infrastructure and skills is noted.  In the event of a hard Brexit, there would be an 
opportunity to return to 1970s-style selective industrial policies and public-interest-based 
competition policy.  An advantage of a soft Brexit is that it would preclude interventionism of this kind. 
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UK productivity performance has been deeply disappointing in recent years.  Naturally, this means 
that there are good reasons to review supply-side policy.  Perhaps the ‘post-Thatcher consensus’ 
which prevailed prior to 2008 is past its ‘sell-by date’ and needs to be discarded.  In particular, it is 
suggested by some that a return to more interventionist industrial policies may be desirable and the 
government has embarked on developing an ‘industrial strategy’.  Moreover, the challenges and 
opportunities presented by Brexit suggest that there may be good reasons to revise the UK’s industrial 
policy stance.  Notably, depending on the terms of Brexit there may be greater scope to implement 
selective industrial policies once outside the EU.   
Against this background, this paper considers what an improved supply-side policy for growth might 
comprise and whether Brexit makes this more or less likely to be implemented.  The paper explores 
the trade-off between the greater economic costs of a harder Brexit and the scope for productivity 
gains that might result from the freedom to implement a new industrial policy.  In this context, lessons 
from the 1970s, when competition and industrial policy settings were very different from those which 
were in place post-Thatcher, are reviewed.  This analysis suggests that a major advantage of a soft 
Brexit is that it would provide a ‘commitment technology’ to constrain the politicization of supply-side 
policy. 
2. Why is Selective Industrial Policy Back in Favour? 
'Industrial policy' is perhaps best defined in the manner of Caves (1987) to encompass public sector 
intervention aimed at changing the distribution of resources across economic sectors and activities.  
Thus, it includes both 'horizontal' policies which focus on activities such as innovation, provision of 
infrastructure and so on, while 'selective' policies aim to increase the size of particular sectors.  The 
classic justification for industrial policy is that it remedies market failures, for example, by providing 
public goods, solving coordination problems, or subsidizing activities with positive externalities.1   
After the election of the Thatcher government, the stance of supply side policy changed markedly.  
Selective industrial policies were phased out, horizontal policies were downsized and narrowed in 
scope with the ending of most investment and employment subsidies, and competition in product 
markets was strengthened considerably, initially through reducing trade barriers and deregulation 
rather than by strengthening anti-trust policy.  Privatization, industrial relations reform, and 
restructuring taxation were new priorities.   
When Labour won a landslide victory in the 1997 election, it was possible to wonder whether in 
government it would revert to 'Old Labour' policies.  The answer soon became apparent and was a 
resounding 'No'.  1970s-style policy was conspicuous by its absence: there was no nationalization 
programme, no move to subsidize manufacturing investment, no counterpart of the National 
Enterprise Board, no return to high marginal rates of direct tax, no attempt to resist de-
industrialization by supporting declining industries, and no major reversal of industrial relations 
reform. Implicitly, the Thatcher supply-side reforms had been accepted and a ‘post-Thatcher 
consensus’ prevailed.  The changes that ‘New Labour’ made were to strengthen some aspects of 
                                                          
1 An excellent overview can be found in Warwick (2013). 
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horizontal industrial policies with a new emphasis on education, R & D, investing in public capital, and 
strengthening competition policy. 
In the last ten years or so, however, there has been a renewed interest in and respectability of 
selective industrial policy among UK policymakers.  This realignment of policy has been gradual and 
does not yet mark a return to the 1970s but has, nevertheless, gathered pace from Labour’s New 
Industry, New Jobs (2009) through the Coalition’s The Plan for Growth (2011) to the Conservatives’ 
Building Our Industrial Strategy (Cm. 9528, 2017).  Twenty years ago this would not have seemed very 
likely so what has changed? 
First, and most obviously, productivity performance has been extremely disappointing and a strong 
contrast with a decent record in the years up to 2007, as is reported in Table 1.  On the eve of the 
crisis, UK economic growth was generally seen as quite satisfactory (Van Reenen, 2013).  Subsequent 
developments have come as a rude shock; in 2017 quarter 4, real GDP per hour worked was only 1.8 
per cent above the pre-crisis peak level seen in 2007 quarter 4.  It would have been 19.6 per cent 
higher if pre-crisis trend growth had been sustained (ONS, 2018).  Of itself, this prolonged stagnation 
in labour productivity growth might signal the need for a re-think of supply-side policy.   
A striking feature of the difference between pre- and post-2007 is the much diminished contribution 
from financial services in the latter period and associated with this the widespread feeling that the 
economy needed re-balancing – in Peter Mandelson’s memorable phrase, there should be ‘less 
financial engineering, more real engineering’.  That said, productivity growth in manufacturing has 
also fallen sharply and this has contributed more to the overall slowdown in productivity growth (Table 
2).  This might also be seen as a further justification for a pro-active industrial policy. 
A second important point is that Brexit makes a difference in at least two ways.  On the one hand, 
depending on how Brexit is implemented, the UK may no longer be subject to the state-aid rules of 
the EU which preclude many forms of selective industrial policy. If this constraint is removed, it is 
natural that vote-seeking politicians will wish to explore the expanded policy space that results.  On 
the other hand, Brexit may well make the UK less attractive as a destination for FDI.  A recent estimate 
suggests that Brexit implies a potential reduction of 22 per cent in inflows of FDI (Dhingra et al., 2016).  
If so, the UK government would probably want to make a policy response but might well find 
horizontal policy too expensive.2   
Last, but not necessarily least, memories of the 1970s have now faded.  In the aftermath of that 
decade, well-informed commentators who had been quite sympathetic to selective industrial policy 
in principle concluded that in practice it appeared to be "directed at helping old industries to survive 
rather than encouraging new products and new technology" (Silberston, 1981, p. 49) and that, 
although 'picking winners' may have been the aspiration, "it was losers like Rolls Royce, British Leyland 
and Alfred Herbert who picked Ministers" (Morris and Stout, 1985, p. 873).  But this is now distant 
history. 
                                                          
2 For example, on the basis of the central estimate of the semi-elasticity of FDI flows of 3.7 in OECD (2007), to 
offset Brexit through reducing the corporate tax rate would require a cut of 6.5 percentage points which has 
an annual cost of about £16 billion.  As the government said in the Green Paper on industrial strategy, ‘we 
want to focus our efforts on strategic inward investment that most contributes to wealth creation in the UK’. 
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3. What Would Improve Supply-Side Policy for Growth? 
Decent growth before the financial crisis occurred in the context of the ‘post-Thatcher consensus’ on 
supply-side policy which was shared by New Labour and the Conservatives.  Equally, the subsequent 
productivity slowdown has developed under very similar policies since there has been substantial 
continuity in the last ten years.  Of itself, the financial crisis does not imply that pre-crisis growth was 
illusory or somehow unsustainable, which might imply a general policy failure, but rather reflects 
inadequate financial regulation.  But the advent of the crisis has had a significant impact on 
productivity performance over the ‘lost decade’ since 2008. 
Banking crises reflect market failures in the banking sector combined with a failure of regulation to 
address them effectively.  The problems arise from moral hazard and coordination failures in a context 
of asymmetric information.  The typical pre-crisis symptom is rapid expansion of credit coupled with 
excessive risk taking.  The likelihood of bank failures increases as leverage goes up and the ratio of 
equity capital to assets falls.  Banking crises happen even in economies with very strong growth 
fundamentals if banks are badly regulated and under-capitalized.  The classic example is the United 
States where about a third of all banks failed in the years 1929 to 1933. 
The financial crisis of 2007-8 in the UK matches this familiar pattern.  Regulation was deficient and 
leverage soared following the deregulation of the 1980s with the median ratio of total assets to 
shareholder claims increasing from around 20 in the 1970s to almost 50 at the pre-crisis peak (ICB, 
2011).  In effect, there was a huge implicit subsidy to risk-taking by banks that were too big to fail and 
were allowed to operate with inadequate equity capital.  This was a major failure of the policy reforms 
undertaken in the 1980s.  That said, it should not be inferred that pre-crisis growth was predicated on 
unsound finance even though the cost of capital would have been higher with resilient bank balance 
sheets.  Miles et al. (2013) offer an illustrative calculation which suggests that the lower capital 
intensity entailed by the introduction of appropriate capital-adequacy regulation would have reduced 
the level of GDP by about 0.2 per cent. 
It is well-known that financial crises can have permanent adverse direct effects on the level of 
potential output.  The transition period while the levels effect materializes and during which growth 
rates are depressed may be quite long.  Oulton and Sebastia-Barrel (2017) found a long-run impact on 
the level of labour productivity of 1.1 per cent per year that the crisis lasts.   There is good reason to 
think that the crisis also had significant temporary effects on productivity performance which may not 
yet have completely evaporated as resource allocation has been seriously impaired.  Redeployment 
of labour appears to have been a key issue as workers have moved to firms with inferior productivity 
characteristics (Schneider, 2018).3 
In sum, it is not obvious that industrial policy needs to be completely re-thought with the attendant 
danger of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’.  Even so, given that Brexit will have an adverse 
effect on productivity compared with the counterfactual of staying in the EU and given that 
productivity performance has been so disappointing in recent years, it is especially opportune to 
consider might be done to improve supply-side policy. 
                                                          




Endogenous-growth theory suggests that policy interventions which raise the appropriable rate of 
return to innovation and/or investment can have positive effects on the rate of growth.  A widely held 
view of the pre-crisis period is that horizontal industrial policies which may be important according to 
growth economics were something of a curate’s egg.  Strengths could be found in regulatory and 
competition policies with weaknesses in education and skills, infrastructure, taxation and, especially, 
innovation policies (Crafts, 2015) with the implication that a high priority for improved supply-side 
policy would be to address the latter group.   
Table 3 reports the results of an admittedly crude attempt to perform a diagnostic check on this 
judgement with a benchmarking exercise which on the whole confirms much of the conventional 
wisdom.4  Weaknesses in skills and innovation policies would be consistent with these scores.  
Transport infrastructure comparisons are notoriously difficult and the indicators shown here suggest 
a mixed picture but with a worrying tendency to road congestion.  The corporate tax rate would be 
highlighted by ministers as a key UK strength, although this is not entirely borne out by the summary 
statistic used here, but a rounded view of the British tax system suggests that it could be made 
considerably more growth friendly without sacrificing other objectives (Mirrlees et al., 2011). 
An important aspect of innovation policy in the UK where the vast majority of new technology 
originates from elsewhere in the world (Eaton and Kortum, 1999) is to facilitate technology transfer.  
Indeed, a substantial part of the social returns to R & D comes through its ‘second face’ in this activity 
(Griffith et al., 2004).  More generally, ‘absorptive capacity’ is central to the effective assimilation and 
diffusion of new technology.  Absorptive capacity is underpinned by education, skills and economic 
competences including organizational effectiveness, appropriate business models and training.  Table 
3 suggests a mixed but generally rather underwhelming position with regard to absorptive capacity – 
relatively low R & D spending, mediocre management quality, poor adult skills but strength in 
intangible investment.   
4. Is the ‘Industrial Strategy’ a Step Forward? 
A White Paper, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain Fit for the Future, was published in November 
2017.  This section considers the general direction of the policy proposals which it sets out in the light 
of the preceding discussion.  The context is that the need to address the UK’s productivity performance 
has become more urgent while Brexit has increased the scope for changes to supply-side policy.  A 
significant part of the new industrial strategy comprises an attempt to improve horizontal industrial 
policies relating to innovation, skills and infrastructure, all of which were noted above as areas of 
concern, but there is also a clear intention to move towards greater use of selective industrial policies.  
Nevertheless, there is acknowledgement at various points in the paper that competition is good for 
productivity performance and also an explicit statement that protectionism is not desirable.  However, 
there is no suggestion of new institutional arrangements to monitor and de-politicize industrial policy. 
Industrial Strategy announces increased government support for R & D, including public funding of 
£12.5 billion by 2021/22, with a target of raising total R& D expenditure to 2.4 per cent of GDP by 
2027.  Measures include increasing the R & D tax credit for large businesses to 1 per cent and a 20 per 
                                                          
4 The scores in Table 4 are based on a distance measure similar to that used by the World Bank in its Doing 
Business evaluations.  Scores indicate what percentage of the difference between the best and worst 
performers in the peer group has been achieved. A score of zero means that the UK is the worst in class. 
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cent rise in funding for the Research Councils by 2019/20.  There is evidence to support both these 
proposals (Guceri and Liu, 2017; Haskel and Wallis, 2013).  There will also be sector deals in which the 
government supports innovation by committing to complementary public investments and an 
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund which will offer grant support on a competitive basis for research 
proposals in areas which are deemed to be Grand Challenges.  There is clearly a significant element of 
selectivity but this might be thought of as ‘soft industrial policy’ with the government as a facilitator 
seeking to address coordination failures rather than to ‘pick winners’ or promote ‘national champions’ 
(Warwick, 2013). 
Action to address the UK’s R & D shortfall is welcome but nevertheless two critical comments on this 
update of innovation policy seem appropriate.  First, the emphasis of these interventions seems rather 
skewed towards the ‘first face’ rather than the ‘second face’ of R & D, i.e., towards invention rather 
than diffusion and absorptive capacity.  Second, it is not fully clear how the priority areas were chosen 
nor how policies favouring particular sectors or research activities will be evaluated. 
Industrial Strategy describes policy changes designed to augment labour-force skills.  There are 
proposals radically to reform technical education and a strong focus on improving STEM skills with an 
announcement of an additional £406 million for maths, digital and technical education.  A target of 3 
million apprenticeships starts by 2020 is highlighted.  Reforms to technical education are intended to 
provide more rigorous training with a notable feature being the introduction of T-levels.  The design 
of the new policies responds to criticisms made in the Sainsbury and Wolf Reports and aims to provide 
qualifications which will be valued by the labour market.  It is also welcome that attention is to be paid 
to improving absorptive capacity in terms of management skills partly through the ‘Be the Business’ 
programme. 
Effective action to remedy the relative shortfall of intermediate skills in the UK is surely desirable and 
there is much to like about these proposals.  Nevertheless, some caveats seem in order.  First, a key 
priority which is not given sufficient emphasis is to ensure a much higher proportion of workers are 
proficient in English and Maths to GCSE A-C standard (Vignoles, 2016).  Second, there is a danger of 
endorsing too narrow a focus on STEM skills especially in the context of the needs of important parts 
of the services sector (Allas, 2014). 
Industrial Strategy notes that public investment in infrastructure will be increased.  In particular, the 
National Productivity Investment Fund will be raised to £31 billion to be committed by 2022/23.  Aside 
from R&D allocations to date have been mainly to housing and to transport.  A more strategic 
approach to Investment in infrastructure will be taken considering a broad range of objectives rather 
than appraising projects on a narrow assessment of benefits and costs.  Infrastructure, especially 
transport infrastructure, is seen as central to ‘rebalancing’ the economy and strengthening growth 
across the UK. 
Increased expenditure on infrastructure is surely justified after many years when investment in public 
capital has been squeezed.  The establishment of a National Infrastructure Commission as an advisory 
body to oversee policy in this area has also been a useful step forward.  Recognition that wider 
economic impacts matter is an important improvement in project appraisal and rigorous 
methodologies to augment traditional cost-benefit analysis of transport schemes are already quite 
well developed (Laird and Venables, 2017).  At the same time, there is clearly a danger of increased 
politicization of decisions and marginalization of quantification of costs and benefits.  HS2, which is 
6 
 
seen as a great triumph by Industrial Strategy, is surely a (very expensive) case in point with an outlay 
of £56 billion gross.  A benefit cost ratio of 2.3 including wider economic benefits is claimed but rests 
on a seriously flawed cost-benefit analysis such that the project may well not pass the usual value-for-
money test (House of Lords, 2015) and compares unfavourably with a BCR of 7.0 for the Road 
Investment Strategy.5  Moreover, the claim that this project will contribute significantly to regional 
rebalancing is not evidence-based but a matter of faith (Tomaney and Marques, 2013). 
The most controversial component of the policy package in Industrial Strategy is likely to be its 
commitment to ‘sector deals’, a new vintage of selective industrial policy.  Four are announced, 
namely, artificial intelligence, automotive sector, construction, and life sciences with several more 
being discussed including creative industries, industrial digitalization, and nuclear.  The general idea is 
of strategic partnerships where various kinds of government support are committed in return for 
action plans with clear leadership on the part of the private sector to raise productivity. 
It was noted earlier that in some circumstances there may be a market-failure justification for selective 
industrial policy.  In the case of these sector deals, however, it is not clear what market failure is being 
addressed and the process by which they have emerged is far from transparent.  A recent review of 
the life-sciences sector deal suggests that the rationale is incoherent and that too much money will 
be given to low return R & D in pharmaceuticals (Jones and Wilson, 2018).  It is also depressing to see 
the nuclear industry once again being favoured so soon after the debacle of Hinkley Point which 
represents a major failure in ‘picking winners’ in energy policy (Helm, 2017; Thomas, 2016).  There is 
no suggestion of a competition impact assessment although potentially there may be competition 
issues.  It appears that new institutional arrangements for proper oversight of sector deals are not 
envisaged.  These are worrying proposals which fall far short of best practice in the conduct of 
industrial policy and which suggest that the extra policy space that Brexit possibly provides may not 
be used well. 
5. What Difference Does Brexit Make? 
Inside the EU the UK still has control over horizontal industrial policies.  It can certainly be argued that 
there is room for considerable improvement in the details of those policies.  Areas of concern include 
under-spending on infrastructure, a badly designed tax system, very restrictive land-use planning 
rules, schools that deliver low-quality education, and innovation policies that result in low levels of R 
& D (Crafts, 2015).  Reforms to these policies are not, however, precluded by EU membership.  The 
obstacles are to be found in Westminster not Brussels and are related to British politics rather than 
constraints imposed by the EU and Brexit makes little or no difference. 
Selective industrial policy, however, is largely precluded by EU rules.  EU membership entails quite 
strict regulation of state aid to industry.  State aid is defined by the EU as an intervention by the state 
which gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis that has distorted or may distort 
competition and which is likely to affect trade between member states.  Such measures, which are 
prohibited, can take a variety of forms including grants, subsidies, loans, guarantees, and tax credits.  
                                                          
5 A recent unpublished report for the Infrastructure and Projects Authority states the costs of HS2 could be as 
much as £90 billion and that successful delivery of the project is not possible (Plimmer and Parker, 2018).  
None of this would be a surprise to Flyvbjerg (2009) who catalogues the disastrous cost-benefit outcomes of 
large bespoke infrastructure projects. 
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These rules apply to all sectors.  There is, however, a General Block Exemption for a range of measures 
which are deemed to address market failures with relatively slight implications for trade.  These 
include aid for research and innovation, regional development, training, risk capital in SMEs etc.  State 
aid has to be notified to and approved by the European Commission whose decisions are subject to 
scrutiny by the EU courts.  The rationale is to underpin the efficiency of the Single Market but, at the 
same time, this represents an important constraint on political discretion in economic policymaking. 
Under this regime, UK expenditure on state aid has been relatively low.  In 2016, state aid was 0.35 
per cent of GDP in the UK.  Table 4 reports the main categories of expenditure and also notes spending 
on sectoral development.  This was only 22 million euros which was about 0.3 per cent of the total.  
This follows a general pattern since the 1980s that selective industrial subsidies have been 
conspicuous by their absence.   
Depending on the type of Brexit that is negotiated, the rules with regard to state aid might change 
very little or quite considerably.  To a first approximation, if the UK remains inside the European 
Economic Area (EEA), the status quo would prevail, although with different enforcement mechanisms.  
If, on the other hand, our relationship with the EU is based just on WTO membership, then there will 
be much greater scope for selective industrial policy, as is reflected in the recent surge in ‘murky 
protectionism’ highlighted by Global Trade Alert (Evenett and Fritz, 2016).  Obviously, it is quite likely 
that Brexit will be on the basis of a trade agreement with the EU, in which case the regulation of state 
aid will be an important aspect to be decided.  It seems almost certain, however, that the EU would 
insist on the continuation of the equivalent of EEA rules.6 
The situation with regard to competition policy is similar in most respects.  UK and EU law and perfectly 
aligned and if the UK remains in the EEA under a soft Brexit nothing much would change.  In any event, 
when Brexit takes place initially competition policy will stay the same and the 1998 Competition Act 
and the 2002 Enterprise Act and the CMA will remain.  This implies that anti-competitive agreements 
and abuse of a dominant position will still be prohibited and that merger control will continue to be 
based on a ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test (Vickers, 2017).  In the longer term, however, 
the UK will be able to reform competition policy and diverge from the EU in the event of trading on 
the basis of WTO rules.7  In that case, an obvious possibility is that the UK might return to a ‘public 
interest’ approach to competition policy in which implications for competition are not the sole criteria 
and issues such as impacts on prospects of realising scale economies or international competitiveness 
of UK firms or impacts on regional balance assume relevance, as in the 1960s and 1970s (Wilks, 1999).  
Theory and experience suggest that supranational competition policy design is more pro-competition 
and less favourable to producer interests than that enacted at a national level (Guttierrez and 
Philippon, 2018) - which implies that hard Brexit could be expected to lead to divergence from the EU.  
So, there is an interesting trade-off for a government wishing to take competition and/or industrial 
policy in an interventionist direction.  This would require a hard Brexit.  A hard Brexit implies higher 
trade costs and lower trade volumes than a soft Brexit and can be expected to have a higher cost, 
perhaps by a factor of 2 or 3 equating to 3 or 4 per cent of GDP every year, in terms of a lower level 
                                                          
6 The guidelines for Brexit negotiations issued by the European Council on April 29, 2017 state that “any deep 
and special trade agreement with the UK ‘must ensure a level playing field in terms of competition and state 
aid’” (EUCO XT 200034/17). 
7 But probably not if there is a trade agreement, see footnote 6. 
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of productivity in the long run (Ebell and Warren, 2016).8  The realised benefits of a different supply-
side policy have to exceed this figure to make it worthwhile. 
It should also be noted that, if Brexit significantly reduces the level of potential GDP relative to the 
counterfactual of staying in, then there will be an adverse effect on UK public finances. A reduction of 
0.6% in GDP would approximately cancel out the improvement from ending the net budgetary 
contribution to the EU.  If hard (WTO) Brexit reduces GDP by 7.5% and soft (EEA) Brexit by 3.8%, the 
net adverse impact on net public sector borrowing is 4.8 and 2.3% of GDP, respectively (Emmerson et 
al., 2016).  Thus, the fiscal implications of hard Brexit make the subsidies required by an interventionist 
policy stance more difficult to deliver. 
For those sceptical of the wisdom of a return to 1970s-style competition and industrial policy, a soft 
Brexit has the added advantage of providing a ‘commitment technology’ that removes the discretion 
to choose this path.  Otherwise, ideally, control of state aid would be by an independent agency with 
safeguards against either political pressure or private-sector lobbying.  The minimal requirements for 
such an agency to be effective are clear enough from previous experience (Banks, 2015).  Its remit 
should be to examine costs and benefits in terms of economy-wide effects on the basis of a 
transparent evidence-based process whose results are in the public domain both on an ex-ante basis 
and also through ex-post evaluation of policy interventions.9  Ideally, the agency’s approval should be 
required for state aid but this design may be infeasible given the current political climate.  A second 
best would be for the agency’s recommendations to be public and that government is required to 
explain any decision to over-rule them.  Similarly, if a public-interest approach to competition policy 
is re-instated, the criteria need to be explicit, the assessment should be made transparently by an 
independent body and ministerial discretion should be minimal. 
6. What are the Lessons from the 1970s? 
The case for selective industrial policies has always been controversial.  The modern literature 
highlights three pro-growth arguments in their favour, namely: infant-industry related capital market 
failures, agglomeration externalities, and rent-switching under imperfect competition (Crafts, 2010).  
However, it has been widely remarked that, in practice, support is disproportionately given to 
declining industries and some economists argue that 'government failure' is an inherent aspect of the 
political economy of industrial policy (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007; Krueger, 1990).  An 
important issue is whether industrial policy reduces competition.  Ideally, industrial policy should be 
used in a competition-friendly way and not through aiming to create ‘national champions’ (Aghion et 
al., 2015). 
The 1970s were an era when selective industrial policy was in vogue and when competition policy was 
framed in terms of interventions based on a public interest criterion.  The decade also saw the UK 
                                                          
8 This reflects the conventional wisdom that the extent of economic integration affects levels rather than 
growth rates of potential output (Badinger, 2005).  If Brexit does affect the rate of productivity growth, as is 
argued by Erken et al. (2018), then the benefits of interventionist policies would need to be much larger; 
enough according to these authors to more than offset a fall of 0.8 percentage points per year in the rate of 
real GDP growth. 
9 The contrast with the way the secret Nissan deal was handled is stark. 
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enter the EEC in 1973, a policy change which significantly increased competition in product markets.  
Lessons can be taken from each of these three features of the period. 
There was a very clear tendency for selective industrial subsidies to be skewed towards relatively few 
industries, notably aircraft, shipbuilding and, latterly, motor vehicles (Table 5).  The high expenditure 
on shipbuilding is striking since this was clearly an industry in which the UK no longer had a 
comparative advantage in the face of Asian competition.  More generally, there is quite a strong bias 
towards shoring up ailing industries which is well reflected in the portfolio of holdings of the National 
Enterprise Board (Wren, 1996b), in the pattern of tariff protection across sectors (Greenaway and 
Milner, 1994), and also in the nationalizations of the 1970s where the prevalence of very poor rates 
of return reflected a lack of political will to eliminate productive inefficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988).   
Moreover, policies to subsidize British high-technology industries with a view to increasing world 
market share in sectors where supernormal profits might be obtained were notably unsuccessful in 
this period in a number of cases including civil aircraft, which by 1974 had cost £1.5 billion at 1974 
prices for a return of £0.14 billion (Gardner, 1976), computers (Hendry, 1989) and nuclear power 
(Cowan, 1990).10  A combination of subsidies to American producers linked to defence spending and 
the relatively small size of the British market undermined these attempts at rent-switching.  Attempts 
to promote ‘national champions’ resulted in expensive failures. 
Two examples of selective industrial policy which are sometimes claimed to have been successful are 
pharmaceuticals and Rolls-Royce but in neither case is the evidence very persuasive.  A major impact 
of government on pharmaceuticals may have come through the demand side and the drug-purchasing 
policies of the NHS.  The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) has shaped the incentives 
facing pharmaceutical companies.  It is suggested by some that over time this acted as a successful 
industrial policy which provided a distinctive form of rate of return regulation which could be 
manipulated by the Department of Health to encourage R and D in the UK (Thomas, 1994).  Moreover, 
given that the industry has earned significant rents on its exports (Garau and Sussex, 2007) this might 
also be seen as an example of success with strategic trade policy.  Other writers are sceptical of this 
view noting that the UK is a small part of the world market and arguing the quality of the science base 
is by far the most important factor in location decisions for R & D in pharmaceuticals (NERA, 2007).  
From this perspective, the most important aspect of government support has been the provision of 
elite research universities with world-class departments in the key sciences together with public 
funding for research through the Medical Research Council.  This was the view taken by OFT (2007) in 
its report which argued for the end of the PPRS. 
Rolls-Royce was nationalized in 1971 and successfully privatized in 1987.  In one way, this can be seen 
as a success for selective industrial policy which saved a company that had made a disastrous error in 
signing a fixed price contract to supply the RB-211 engine to Lockheed. This bankrupted it when 
development and production costs rose far above initial estimates.  Eventually, the sale of Rolls-Royce 
realized £1.36 bn. for the government compared with net subsidies of £0.83 bn. over the previous 20 
years and Rolls-Royce went on to become the highly-profitable, second largest producer of civil-
aircraft engines in the world (Lazonick and Prencipe, 2005).  It should be noted, however, that it was 
                                                          
10 Concorde and the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor were egregious policy errors (Henderson, 1977). 
10 
 
only as the prospect of privatization loomed in the mid-1980s that, under new management, the 
company developed a viable business strategy and worked out a cost-effective way of upgrading the 
RB-211 for the big-engine market.  
Competition policy was inaugurated with the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission in 
1948, evolved through the Restrictive Practices Act (1956) and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (1965), but was mostly ineffective (Clarke et al., 1998).  Few investigations took place, 
very few mergers were prevented, the process was politicized, a variety of ‘public-interest’ defences 
for anti-competitive activities were allowed, and there were no penalties for bad behaviour.  Not 
surprisingly, there is evidence that the British economy was characterized by substantial market power 
in this period (Crafts, 2012). 
The difference-in-differences analysis in Symeonidis (2008) showed that when cartels were 
abandoned following the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act labour productivity growth in formerly-
colluding sectors rose by 1.8 percentage points per year in 1964-73 compared with 1954-63.  This 
finding suggests that a more vigorous competition policy would have improved productivity 
performance.  This point is buttressed by findings that in the 1970s and 1980s greater competition 
increased innovation (Blundell et al., 1999) and raised productivity growth significantly in companies 
where there was no dominant external shareholder (Nickell et al., 1997). Both these results underline 
the role of weak competition in permitting principal-agent problems to undermine productivity 
performance. 
Control of mergers was the aspect of competition policy which was notably undermined by the public 
interest test.  This was not well specified but encouraged consideration of whatever was deemed 
relevant.  As was confirmed by the Fair Trading Act of 1973, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
could only recommend that a merger be blocked on the basis that it would operate against the public 
interest, i.e., the burden of proof was on the MMC, and could only investigate a merger if a reference 
was made by the Minister on the advice of the Director General of the OFT.  Yet, there was a 
widespread belief in government circles that mergers were beneficial because they improved 
productivity and international competitiveness of British business such that competition policy was 
subordinated to industrial policy (Wilks, 1999).  This was epitomized by the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation (1966-1971) which had a brief to accelerate restructuring of UK industry; none of the 
mergers that it promoted was referred to the MMC although many qualified in terms of their 
implications for market share.   
Fairburn (1989) reviewed the overall record and noted that only 25 of 326 mergers which created a 
market share greater than 25 per cent were referred while at least half of those creating a market 
share of over 80 per cent were not referred.  Only about 1.6 per cent of qualifying cases were either 
blocked or abandoned by the promoters.  Yet, the ex-post evidence was that, on average, mergers did 
not generate significant improvements in productivity performance (Cowling et al., 1980; Kumar, 
1984; Meeks, 1977).  A ‘lessening of competition’ test would surely have been preferable. 
Accession to the EEC made an important contribution to increasing competition in UK product 
markets, as proponents of entry had predicted (Williamson, 1971). It was an integral part of the 
Thatcher reforms as was underlined in the early 1980s by her enthusiastic support for the European 
Single Market.  A computable general equilibrium (CGE) exercise using a model incorporating 
imperfect competition and scale economies found that the static effects of reductions in market 
11 
 
power would have contributed a welfare gain equivalent to 2.1 per cent of GDP (Gasiorek et al, 2002).  
However, in addition there must have been favourable dynamic impacts on productivity performance 
associated with the reduction in trade costs.  This would be consistent with the finding of a paper 
using synthetic control group methodology which found that ten years after accession UK GDP was 
raised by 8.6 per cent (Campos et al., 2014). 
The key message from the 1970s’ experience is that using the policy freedom provided by a hard Brexit 
to return to heavy reliance on selective industrial policy and abandoning a lessening of competition 
test as the basis of merger control would be a serious error.  The experience of that decade is 
consistent with the government-failure arguments made by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and 
supports the conclusion of Aghion et al. (2015) that competition policy should not be diluted by trying 
to promote national-champion firms. 
7. Conclusions 
The ‘post-Thatcher consensus’ on industrial policy has ended but the future direction of travel is not 
yet decided.  Weak productivity performance gives some urgency to re-consideration of supply-side 
policy for growth while Brexit potentially opens the door to a return to the interventionist policy 
stance of the 1970s. 
There are good reasons to improve horizontal industrial policies notably in the areas of education and 
skills, innovation and infrastructure.  The proposals in the White Paper on industrial strategy represent 
some progress with a new approach to technical education, increased funding for R&D, and additional 
infrastructure investment.  A greater emphasis on addressing issues of absorptive capacity would be 
welcome as the policies evolve.  EU membership has not been the reason for failings in horizontal 
policies so Brexit does not really change anything in this respect. 
Selective industrial policy is back in fashion and the scope for it would be substantially increased by a 
hard Brexit which would mean leaving the EU’s state aid and competition policies.  Some politicians 
may see this as a good reason to reject a soft Brexit.  In the past, selective industrial policies have 
generally not been successful in terms of promoting better productivity performance and the use of 
public interest criteria in competition policy had unfortunate consequences.  There are good reasons 
to keep the current competition policy regime and, in the event of a hard Brexit, it would be important 
to develop a new institutional architecture to mitigate government failure in industrial policy. 
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Table 1. Rates of Growth of Real GDP/Person and Real GDP/Hour Worked (% per year) 
 Y/P Y/HW 
1950-1973   
France 4.02 5.29 
Germany 5.00 5.91 
UK 2.42 2.81 
USA 2.45 2.57 
1973-1995   
France 1.65 2.67 
Germany 1.76 2.86 
UK 1.76 2.40 
USA 1.81 1.27 
1995-2007   
France 1.70 1.77 
Germany 1.54 1.70 
UK 2.41 2.09 
USA 2.18 2.30 
2007-2016   
France 0.06 0.66 
Germany 0.84 0.68 
UK 0.19 0.09 
USA 0.46 0.85 
 
Note: Germany is West Germany prior to 1995. 




Table 2.  Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth: 2008-2015 vs. 1999-2007 (% per 
year) 
 Contribution Share of Total 
Decline (%) 
Change in Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
Manufacturing -0.8   17.0 -4.2 
Financial & Insurance -0.6   10.2 -5.6 
Information & Communication -0.5     8.7 -5.5 
Rest of Economy -0.9   63.1 -1.4 
Total -2.8 100.0 -2.8 
 
Note:  contribution is change in labour productivity growth multiplied by output share in market 
sector. 




Table 3.  Indicators of Competitiveness 
 DTF Score Performance Level 
Logistics Infrastructure (2016) 82.96 4.21 (1-5 scale) 
Competition Law and Policy (2013) 82.85 0.123 (0-6 scale) 
Product Market Regulation (2013) 80.49 1.08 (0-6 scale) 
Intangible Investment (average 2000-13) 79.10 9.0 %GDP 
Ease of Doing Business (2017) 76.63 7th/190 countries 
Employment Protection (2013) 71.23 1.10 (0-6 scale) 
Corporate Tax Rate (2017) 69.49 18.5% effective average tax rate 
PISA Maths and Science Score (2015) 57.14 500.5 (500 OECD average) 
Management Quality (average 2004-14) 53.23 3.033 (1-5 scale) 
Adult Literacy and Numeracy Skills (2013) 42.40 267.2 (267 OECD average) 
R & D (2016) 30.97 1.69 %GDP 
Tangible Investment (average 1997-2017)   0.00 16.7 %GDP 
Annual Hours in Congestion (2015)   0.00 41.5 hours/vehicle 
 
Notes: 
‘Distance to frontier’ (DTF) is calculated on a similar basis to World Bank (2018), namely, (Worst – 
x)/(Worst – Best) but on the basis of performance only in ‘old OECD’ countries. 
‘Competition Law and Policy’ is an unweighted average of three components: scope of action, policy 
on anti-competitive behaviour, and probity of investigation. 
Sources (in descending order): 
World Bank (2016) 
Alemani et al. (2013)  
OECD (2014a) 
Corrado et al. (2018) 
World Bank (2018) 
OECD (2014b) 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2017) 
OECD (2016a) 








Table 4.  UK Expenditure on State Aid, 2016 (million euros) 
Environmental Protection and Energy Saving 3256.9 
R & D and Innovation 2452.4 
SME 2029.1 
Regional Development   360.4 
Sectoral Development     22.0 
Other   180.8 
Total 8301.6 
 
Note: total excludes agriculture and transport. 




Table 5.  Grant-Equivalent Expenditure on Sectoral and Firm-Specific Industrial Subsidies 









Shipbuilding Other Total 
1964/5 14     62     76 
1965/6 10     93   22  125 
1966/7   1   1  144   25  171 
1967/8    7  213   30  250 
1968/9  48  272   56  376 
1969/70  35  292 143   1 471 
1970/1  33  269 124   8 434 
1971/2  17  400   47 18 482 
1972/3  32  345 102 25 504 
1973/4  25   14 235 108 58 440 
1974/5   5 21     7 276 232 17 558 
1975/6   7 17     2 211 125   4 366 
1976/7 18    33   67 128    1 247 
1977/8 41  455   37 153   1 687 
1978/9 70  273   83   84   1 511 
1979/80 72  227   22 105   1 427 
1980/1 65  307     7 108   1 488 
1981/2 31  437     1 118   1 588 
1982/3 30  291     7   78   1 407 
 
Note: ‘industrial support’ excludes aircraft and shipbuilding and was mainly given to the motor 
industry. 
Source: Wren (1996a, Table 3) 
 
